

ABM

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## ***Soviet Satellite Believed Able to Intercept Others***

Reuter

A Soviet satellite has for the first time destroyed a target below an altitude of 160 miles, indicating the Russians can now intercept reconnaissance satellites, the authoritative Aviation Week magazine said yesterday.

"Ability to intercept reconnaissance satellites would be a major advantage to a major power. The Soviets now appear to possess this capability along with the capability of intercepting high-flying communication vehicles," the magazine said.

The U.S. Defense Department refused to comment on the report.

The magazine, which did not give any source for its report said the Russians launched Cosmos 459 Nov. 29 at an altitude of 156 miles.

Four days later Cosmos 462 was launched by the Soviet Anti-Cosmos Defense Forces (PKO) at the same inclination as Cosmos 459. "Cosmos 462 exploded during an approach to Cosmos 459, breaking into 13 identifiable objects," Aviation Week said.

Two Soviet Cosmos satellites were earlier intercepted at altitudes of 360 and 550 miles, the magazine said.

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ARM

# SOVIET MAY HAVE NEW MISSILE IN '72

Penagon Aides Say Tests  
Appear Near Conclusion

By WILLIAM BEECHER  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 2—Pen-  
tagon analysts say the Soviet  
Union appears to be nearing  
the successful conclusion of  
tests of a new long-range sub-  
marine missile and may deploy  
the weapon next year.

The missile, called the Saw-  
fly by Western analysts, has a  
range of up to 3,500 miles, ap-  
proximately twice that of the  
best Soviet operational subma-  
rine missile. The best American  
submarine missile, the Posei-  
don, has a range of about 3,000  
miles.

Analysts say there have been  
about 15 tests of the Sawfly  
since mid-1969, with a flurry of  
firings this fall. All but four  
of the tests were successful,  
sources say, and the failures  
came early in the program.

"We think they can and  
probably will deploy next  
year," one senior official said.

Most analysts believe the  
new missiles will first be car-  
ried by one of two existing  
types of Soviet submarines, the  
H-class or the Y-class. Later, it  
is expected they will be car-  
ried by a new submarine de-  
signed for them.

Earlier this week, the De-  
fense Department awarded a  
contract to Lockheed Aircraft  
Corporation to develop a  
longer-range submarine mis-  
sile. Unofficial estimates are  
that it will have a range of  
about 4,000 miles. It will not  
be available, however, for sev-  
eral years.

The importance of longer  
range, analysts explained, is  
that it provides a larger area  
of ocean for submarine to hide  
in while still being able to  
reach its target.

Sources say there have been  
at least four Sawfly test fir-  
ings since September. The mis-  
siles are launched from a na-  
val missile testing center near  
the White Sea across the So-  
viet Union, landing in the Kam-  
chatka Peninsula in Soviet  
Asia.

Sources say the Sawfly car-  
ries a "significantly larger"  
warhead than the Soviet SSN-  
6 missile, 16 of which are car-  
ried on each Y-class subma-  
rine. The SSN-6 is estimated to  
carry a warhead of from one

to two megatons. A megaton  
is a measure of explosive force  
equal to a million tons of TNT.

## Megaton Warhead for Poseidon

Most American Polaris mis-  
siles carry a one-megaton war-  
head. The Poseidon missile,  
which is being placed on 31 of  
the 41 Polaris submarines, car-  
ries from 10 to 14 warheads  
of about 40 kilotons each. A  
kiloton is equivalent to 1,000  
tons of TNT.

Sources note that while the  
Soviet has been actively test-  
ing various multiple warheads  
on their missiles, none of  
these tests has been specifi-  
cally associated with the Saw-  
fly.

Some analysts are particu-  
larly concerned about the So-  
viet missile submarine program  
because the Russians now are  
credited with having at least  
42 Y-class submarines afloat or  
under construction and are cur-  
rently doubling the size of  
their construction facility at  
Severodvinsk, on the White  
Sea, where most of their mis-  
sile submarines are built.

The United States is attempt-  
ing, in arms-control negotia-  
tions, to persuade the Russians  
to stop building missile sub-  
marines as well as land-based  
missiles. So far, knowledge-  
able administration sources say,  
the Russians have been cool  
to including missile submarines  
in a strategic weapons freeze.

In addition to Y-class sub-  
marines, the Soviet Union also  
has about 10 H-class crafts,  
which carry three 600-mile mis-  
siles each.

There has been considerable  
speculation that the Russians  
might place the Sawfly first in  
the H-class submarine, because  
600-mile missiles require the  
Russians to come too close to  
shore in order to hit inland tar-  
gets. The closer the submarine  
comes to shore, the greater the  
chance of its discovery and  
destruction.

But just as the United States  
has started a program to place  
its advanced Poseidon missile  
on all but 10 of its 41 Polaris  
submarines, the Russians might  
want to modernize their Y-class  
fleet the same way, some  
analysts suggest.

In addition to missile sub-  
marines, the Soviet also has  
about 35 submarines that carry  
from six to eight cruise missiles,  
each with a 400-mile range.  
These are regarded as primarily  
designed for use against surface  
ships, rather than targets  
ashore.

ARM

8 NOV 1971

BY STEWART ALSOP

## GROSS IMMORALITY

WASHINGTON—What in hell has happened to this country's sense of simple fairness? More specifically, what in hell has happened to the Democratic Party's sense of national responsibility?

These anguished questions must now be asked, as a result of the Senate vote on the foreign-aid bill, and above all the Cooper-Church amendment to that bill. The amendment failed by one vote. It required an end to all logistic support for South Vietnam. If it had become law, it would, of course, have ensured the occupation of South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese Army and the installation of a Communist regime in Saigon.

Those favoring the amendment included every single Northern Democrat except Henry Jackson. Yet by the standards of this country's past, a vote for the amendment can only be described as an act of gross immorality.

Here a personal word seems called for. Some months ago, The New York Times described me as a "dedicated supporter of the Indochina war," and others seem to have that impression. The fact is that I was—and in writing—highly dubious about the American commitment in Vietnam long before Sen. William Fulbright was leading the fight for the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

### CHECKING BACK

Way back in February 1964, for example, I wrote in The Saturday Evening Post, "Direct intervention in South Vietnam, this time without U.N. support, could mean a war as long, as unwinnable, and as internally divisive as the Korean War—perhaps more so." Two themes, I find on checking back, are tediously repeated—that it is an "American delusion" to "suppose that air power can be substituted for ... infantry" (June 1964); and that it is also a delusion that regular U.S. troops can deal effectively with an essentially political war in an alien culture.

In early 1966, after the commitment of U.S. combat troops, I wrote that our intervention was based on a "great miscalculation," and in 1967 I wrote from Vietnam that "The American combat troops ... in the populated areas are like blind giants, stumbling among pygmies, stepping on some and killing them, being pinched and pricked and bitten by others." Therefore it would be a "tragic error" to commit Ameri-

can troops to the pacification mission.

In September 1969, in a column proposing rapid withdrawal of ground troops from Vietnam, I wrote that "the war ... is poisoning the body politic of the United States; ... it is better to risk military disaster in Vietnam than political disaster in the United States." This theme has also been tediously repeated in this space.

All this is not to suggest that I have always been right about Vietnam—I have often been wrong. It is to suggest that I am not a "dedicated supporter" of the war, with a deep emotional commitment to our involvement there. And this seems a necessary prelude to what is after all a most serious charge—that those who voted for the Cooper-Church amendment, who include several men I deeply respect, thereby committed a grossly immoral act.

### LAVISH SUPPORT

Consider certain undisputed facts. First, the North Vietnamese have been, and are still being, lavishly supported logistically and economically by the Soviet Union and China. Their support has been estimated on the order of \$2 billion to \$3 billion a year, but such dollar estimates mean little. What means a lot is that the North Vietnamese Army has been equipped with very fine weapons, including tanks, anti-aircraft guns, and infantry weapons better than we have been able to supply to the South Vietnamese.

Second, there were over 100,000 North Vietnamese regular troops in Laos and Cambodia before so much as an American or South Vietnamese platoon crossed the border into either country. And this Communist invasion of Laos and Cambodia was in support of a larger invasion of South Vietnam.

Third, the U.S. Army, inevitably, remade the South Vietnamese Army in its own cumbersome image. The South Vietnamese are now as dependent on logistic and economic support from this country as a baby on its mother.

Fourth, the U.S. Army in Vietnam has already for all practical purposes ceased to be a fighting army. And yet, as our Army has withdrawn, the security situation in South Vietnam has steadily improved, as almost everyone who has had a first-hand look agrees. The reason is obvious—the South Vietnamese, as John Kennedy once remarked,

have to fight their own war if they are to survive, and that is just what they are at last doing.

The President proposes rapidly to reduce the American commitment to between 30,000 and 50,000 support troops—the figure should be much closer to 30,000, if the generals can be badgered into cutting back the vastly extravagant U.S. staff and personnel system. The men remaining in Vietnam will continue for a time to give the South Vietnamese a minimum of air and helicopter support, on which we have also made them dangerously dependent. These men will all be professionals and volunteers—and what, after all, are professional soldiers for, if not to take some risks in the national interest?

The Northern Democrats, and the eleven Republicans, who voted for the Cooper-Church amendment, voted quite simply, to cut the South Vietnamese off at the knees. The chief excuse for so doing is that the South Vietnamese have failed to produce a model democracy, and thus the South Vietnamese people lack a "choice."

### SILLY CHARADE

The attempt to produce an American-model democracy in wartime Vietnam was a silly charade from the beginning, put on for purely U.S. domestic political purposes. In fact, the South Vietnamese do have a choice. Just about every able-bodied man in the country is now armed, and if they want to choose the Communists, all they have to do is turn their guns the other way.

For this country to remove the choice, forcing the South Vietnamese to surrender by cutting off all logistic support, would be a signal to the whole world, and especially to Moscow and Peking. The President has repeatedly told his Congressional leaders that the Communists' interest in serious negotiations "ebbs and flows." It ebbs fast when the new isolationists seem to be winning control of Congress.

But that is not all. To force those who have fought on our side to surrender would be a terrible betrayal, an act of gross immorality. It is hard to believe that men of the stature of Edmund Muskie and Edward Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey and Walter Mondale could vote for such an act, however politically expedient such a vote may be.

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NEW YORK TIMES

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# Generals Say the Nation's Air Strength Is Declining

By DREW MIDDLETON

Air Force Commanders believe their service has entered a critical period in which American strategic and tactical air power is declining while that of the Soviet Union is expanding.

The three chief elements in the Air Force's problem, according to senior generals, are:

1. The Air Force's basic weapons systems, the B-52 bomber and the F-4 fighter-bomber, are nearing obsolescence and must be replaced, at high cost, by the B-1 and the F-15.

2. Intelligence gathered by satellites indicates that the Soviet Union has established a solid lead over the United States in land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, is building emplacements for larger missiles and has deployed the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, or FOBS, which enables Soviet commanders to bring their missiles down on a target from any direction. This makes it possible for the missile to escape many of the existing means of detection.

3. These developments are taking place against a national background of budgetary stringency.

Gen. Bruce K. Holloway, commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command, deplored what he termed "the lack of understanding [and] the indifference to the threat we face," and emphasized that the Air Force "must get the needed modernization" if the United States is to have a credible deterrent in this decade.

## Soviet Build-Up Seen

The Air Force generals are aware of the Nixon Administration's commitment to the current talks on limiting strategic arms. And they say that they, too, hope that the talks will succeed. But their intelligence sources report a continuing build-up of Soviet nuclear weapons.

Air Force promotion of the new B-1 bomber has encountered opposition based on Russia's de-emphasis of the heavy bomber.

bomber force consists of about 195 aircraft, Bears and Bisons, with 50 of the latter normally used as tankers. Bears regularly patrol in the North Atlantic.

Prototypes of a new swing-wing, supersonic bomber, given the code name Backfire by the West, have also been seen.

According to a report last month by the Senate Armed Services Committee, "as yet there is no evidence that they [the Russians] have actually made a decision to produce and deploy [the Backfire]. However, if it so elects, the Soviet Union can certainly build and deploy this bomber and this would require a reassessment of our air defense requirements."

## 'Hardware' Problem

Every airman consulted, from generals at the Pentagon to mechanics at Da Nang in South Vietnam, emphasized that weapons and equipment, not morale, is the Air Force's first problem.

Last June 30, the Air Force had 125,000 officers and 625,000 enlisted men.

This all-volunteer force has benefited from the draft. The consensus is that half of the Air Force's enlistments are draft-induced, although some senior officers believe the figure may be closer to 70 per cent. The Air Force, like all the services, will face a problem if the draft is abandoned in favor of a volunteer army.

Gen. John D. Ryan, the Air Force Chief of Staff, maintained that morale was good, a comment echoed by commanders, noncommissioned officers and airmen at bases in this country and abroad. General Ryan said that racial and drug problems in the Air Force were not as pronounced as in the Army because the Air Force "attracts a higher-quality man."

## Modernization Needed

"The main problem is modernization," the general continued. "Over 50 per cent of our combat aircraft are 10 years old or more."

The Air Force now has about 3,675 combat planes—bombers, fighters and fighter-bombers, and interceptors.

The Strategic Air Command's manned nuclear bomber force is built around the B-52, of which about 490 are active. SAC received its first B-52 in June, 1955. The latest model, the B-52D, entered the production line in 1962.

The B-52H has a speed of 650 miles an hour, a range of more than 10,000 miles, a ceiling of more than 50,000 feet and a bomb load of more than 20,000 pounds. In Southeast Asia, B-52D's have been modified to carry 60,000 pounds of conventional bombs.

The Air Force also has 75 FB-111's, a medium-range bomber with a payload of 37,500 pounds and a speed of Mach 2.2, or 2.2 times the speed of sound. (At sea level and at 32 degrees Fahrenheit, sound travels at a speed of 1,088 feet a second.)

## Newest Bomber

The FB-111, which came into service last year, is the newest Air Force bomber. The original F-111 model encountered grave difficulties, largely because of the mechanism controlling its swing wing. But this trouble has not affected the FB-111 model.

After a long period of testing, the aircraft proved "superior to what we expected," according to General Holloway. But the Air Force insists that the FB-111 cannot be considered a substitute for the B-1 because its range at low altitudes is limited and its capacity to accommodate advanced penetration aids is restricted.

Of the Air Force's 2,350 active fighters, slightly more than 1,000 are F-4's, which have a speed of Mach 2.4 and can be armed with bombs and missiles. But it was designed in the nineteen-fifties and went into service nine years ago. The Air Force considers the Soviet MIG-21J to be superior in speed, maneuverability and acceleration.

Other fighters include the A-1, the A-7, the F-5, the F-86, the F-100, the F-104, the F-105 and the F-111.

The Air Force's 430 active interceptors are F-101's, F-102's, F-104's and F-106's.

## Three Basic Types

The Air Force deploys two of America's three basic types of strategic offensive forces: manned bombers and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Navy's ballistic missile (Polaris or Poseidon) submarines are the third missile system in what the Pentagon calls the triad.

The current level of the Minuteman force, 1,000 missiles, was reached in April, 1962. There are 302 Minuteman missiles.

Modernization of the Minuteman has continued since October, 1965, when Minuteman 2 was accepted. Minuteman 3, which evolved from Minuteman 2, has a range of 8,000 miles and more penetration aids to counter an antimissile defense. It carries three MIRV (multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle) warheads of about 200 kilotons each. Each kiloton is the equivalent of 1,000 tons of TNT.

The Minuteman 1, which has been in service since 1962, is to be phased out. By the end of 1974, SAC will have a missile force of about 500 Minuteman 3's and 500 Minuteman 2's.

The Titan 2 has been operational since 1963. It carries a payload of five to 10 megatons—largest of the American intercontinental ballistic missiles—and has a range of 7,250 miles. The Air Force has three Titan 2 squadrons, consisting of 18 missiles each.

Brig. Gen. Harry N. Cordes, SAC's Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, views the Soviet missile threat as a "mix" in which offensive and defensive weapons are blended to a degree unknown in the West.

The offense is represented by an ICBM force of about 1,600 launchers. Dr. John S. Foster, the Defense Department's research chief, reported recently that the construction of new silos, or launching sites, has reached the same high rate at which SS-9 and SS-11 sites were built last year.

## Early Missiles Retained

Since the early nineteen-sixties, the Russians have developed a large number of ballistic missile systems. Two of the earlier systems, the SS-7 and SS-8, were deployed in limited numbers. Although they have been overtaken by newer systems, they have been retained.

The SS-11 is one of the three ICBM systems now being deployed. There are more than 900 SS-11 launchers, more than for any other type. The SS-11 has a range of 6,500 miles and a warhead yield of one to two megatons.

The SS-13, code-named Savage, is the Soviet Union's first operational solid fuel propellant ICBM. It has a range of 5,000 miles and a yield of one megaton.

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The SS-9 is considered to be the most powerful Soviet ICBM system. Silos for more than 300 SS-9's have been completed or are under construction. The SS-9 can deliver a single 25 megaton warhead or, when fitted with MIRV, combinations of smaller megaton-range multiple warheads. The missile can carry three five - megaton warheads to a range of over 5,000 miles.

Avoiding the implications of the current talks on limiting strategic arms, the Air Force reports, "Although we are uncertain of their future force goals, based on the level of activity in recent years, the Soviets could achieve a force of well over 2,000 hardened ICBM's by 1975."

The Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces also deploy about 700 medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles; 70 cover targets in China and Japan, and 630 cover targets in Western Europe.

The Russian defensive system ranges from antiaircraft artillery to antimissile missiles.

Moscow is protected by 64 launchers firing the Galosh missile. There are indications that its antimissile defense will be strengthened by the introduction of the Tallinn system, employing the SA-5 for use against high - flying aircraft and, probably, ballistic missile systems.

These and other defensive weapons are knit to new and more accurate radar systems.

The Soviet Union also has a force of more than 3,000 fighter interceptors; three new types have come into service in the last five years.

#### Tactical Planes

Soviet air strength is not confined to missiles and bombers. A tactical air force of about 5,000 planes includes such high performance aircraft as the Mig-21J, the Yak-28P and the Yak-28, a supersonic light bomber.

Tactical and strategic commanders of the United States Air Force differ on many points, including the usefulness of high-performance aircraft in ground support. Tactical commanders also feel that their fighters and bombers can do the job assigned to strategic bombers if the tactical planes can fly from advanced bases. But the consensus is that the Air Force must have the B-1 and the F-15.

## Laird vs. Nixon

Secretary Laird's alarmist reports on the Soviet strategic missile buildup at sea and on land contrasts curiously with President Nixon's optimism about stabilization of the nuclear arms race.

In announcing his plan for the visit to Moscow by an American President, Mr. Nixon said the other day that the projected Soviet-American summit meeting reflected a conclusion by "both of us" that "neither major power can get a decisive advantage over the other . . . which might enable it to engage in international blackmail."

Mr. Laird, however, in announcing that the Soviet Union would match America's 41 Polaris submarines by 1973, said: "I believe we would be placed at a very great political disadvantage if the Soviet Union were able to ring the United States with a vastly superior Polaris-type fleet off all our coasts and outdistance us by a large number of missiles."

What are the facts? The facts are that 100 American nuclear warheads delivered on target can inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union. Beyond 400 delivered warheads, which would knock Russia out of the twentieth century—inflicting 100 million Soviet fatalities and destroying three-fourths of Soviet industry—no useful increment of damage can be obtained by an increase in the numbers of attacking hydrogen bombs. The United States now has more than 5,000 separately targetable strategic warheads and is racing toward a force of more than 8,000 such hydrogen warheads. The chosen instrument of American nuclear escalation is the MIRV multiple warhead, already installed in the first four of 31 projected Poseidon submarines, and in 150 or more Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

MIRV was designed to penetrate a heavy Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. No such system is being built. The Soviet Union has offered to freeze its small, obsolete Moscow ABM system at approximately present levels as part of the pending first-stage strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) agreement. An ABM agreement is virtually certain by early next year, before Mr. Nixon's Moscow trip, limiting ABMs to very low levels. The tremendous expansion of American offensive delivery vehicles now under way will be overkill then and, in fact, has been nothing but overkill for a long time. The four American Poseidon submarines already operational can fire many more warheads than the 25 Polaris-type submarines the Soviet Union now has at sea.

The Soviet Union is equally guilty of building overkill. Its chosen instrument is the force of huge SS-9 ICBMs, expansion of which might one day threaten the American Minuteman force. The rate of expansion of this force has dropped from 55 a year to about 40 a year. But some 30 "big holes" have been started since January—not 90, as some reports suggest. Two thirds of the "new holes" are for much smaller missiles, indicating that further expansion is taking the form of an improved silo or missile or both.

The Soviet Union has indicated a willingness to freeze further expansion of this and other land-based missiles in a first-stage SALT agreement. But it wants to hold out for a second-stage agreement a freeze on ballistic missile submarines, which the United States insists must be incorporated in the agreement now under discussion.

The American proposal would freeze the Soviet Union into a position of numerical inferiority in warheads, pending Soviet MIRV development, which evidently is lagging. The Soviet Union evidently wants to be free to press ahead with submarine deployment, in addition, as a "bargaining chip" in the second-stage negotiation, just as the United States is pressing ahead with Safeguard and MIRV now.

Mr. Nixon sees that none of this is of major significance in the strategic balance. A few extra missiles or submarines on one side or the other can make no difference when both already have many thousands more warheads than they need to deter attack. But Mr. Laird insists that the United States, which has enjoyed vast nuclear superiority for a quarter-century, will not permit the Soviet Union to exceed parity, meaningless as that would be.

Politically, Mr. Laird may be right—and Moscow would do well to pay heed to the consequences of pressing forward with futile and expensive further deployment of nuclear missiles at a time when a SALT agreement is within reach. But Mr. Laird could make a major contribution himself by curbing America's chosen instruments of missile expansion, MIRV and Safeguard, as the Senate long has urged.



APM

# Nuclear Build-Up in Soviet Worrying U.S. Strategists

By WILLIAM BEECHER  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 19—A number of officials charged with responsibility for national security are increasingly sounding the alarm—privately more than publicly—over the Soviet build-up of strategic nuclear weapons. They are doing so despite President Nixon's public insistence that he is encouraged by progress toward achieving at least a limited halt in the arms race.

Essentially the concern of a growing array of analysts—nominal hawks and doves alike—is that the Soviet Union apparently does not share the American nuclear philosophy of having a nuclear force that can ride out a first strike and retaliate primarily against cities, rather than against the other side's remaining nuclear weapons. By maintaining such a potential for "assured destruction," the American strategy seeks to deter nuclear war.

The United States as a matter of policy has avoided building big, accurate warheads that could threaten to destroy large numbers of hardened or reinforced Soviet missile silos, either in a first strike or in retaliation.

American strategists concede that if both sides chose to fire their vast arsenals of missiles at each other's cities, no matter who fired first, both countries would be devastated.

## Cuban Crisis Recalled

But, recalling how the Soviet Union backed down in the face of superior American nuclear strength during the Cuban missile confrontation in 1962, they worry lest the Russians may be aiming for so large a lead in numbers of missiles that they might use it in future crises to force a similar American back-down.

And American strategists worry, too, that the Russians, by concentrating on very large intercontinental ballistic missiles, capable of being fitted in the future with swarms of accurate multiple warheads, might also be seeking a second objective—a "war-fighting" rather than a "war-detering" nuclear capability.

In a little-noticed speech early last week, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird delivered a guarded statement of concern in language that for him was uncustomarily emotional.

"The American people today may perhaps be willing to accept strategic parity," he told a meeting of the Association for the United States Army. "But I can conceive of no circumstances in which the American people would accept inferiority. And so long as I am Secretary of Defense, I would never recommend and would certainly oppose any national security program which would place us in an inferior position—a position that might force any American President to crawl to a negotiating table."

## Unease Is Increasing

Mr. Laird offered no facts and figures on the shifting nuclear balance, either then or at a Pentagon news conference last Wednesday. But senior analysts in the Defense Department and other Government agencies say his remarks were a pale reflection of the mounting unease within the Administration on the implications of the continuing Soviet strategic build-up.

It does not appear to be a case where hard-liners in Government are trying to sabotage or undermine the strategic arms limitation talks. Most officials say any agreement that slows the pace of the Soviet weapons effort will be all to the good, especially if it creates momentum behind even more comprehensive agreements to follow.

President Nixon has expressed a similar attitude. Last month he declared that neither country "at this time" was in a position to gain clearcut superiority over the other.

The concern of some of his top aides, however, looks not to present instability but to the shape of the nuclear balance if current Soviet nuclear construction continues unabated.

## Limit on Arms Pact Seen

If the analysis of Soviet objectives is correct—and increasing numbers of officials are reluctantly concluding it may be

—the concern is that the Russians would be willing to negotiate only a limited sort of arms agreement. This, the strategists say, would be one that would not stand in the way of achieving either the numerical superiority in offensive missiles that might be exploitable in political-military confrontations, or the kinds and numbers of weapons that might be used to fight and win a nuclear war.

After two years of hard negotiations, some point out, the Russians now appear willing to stop new construction of intercontinental ballistic missiles, of which they have about 600 more than the United States. They balk at halting new missile submarine production, even though if they finish U-boats already under way they should match in numbers the 41-boat American Polaris fleet in one or two years, and they argue strenuously against the United States being allowed to build more antiballistic missiles than they.

The United States since 1967 has had 1,054 ICBM's, and has started to place two- and three-part multiple warheads onto 550 of them. The Russians have well over 1,600 ICBM's, both operational and under construction. They have started to put three-part multiple warheads onto some of their large SS-9 missiles and have tested similar warheads for their smaller SS-11 ICBM's.

## U.S. Also Taking Action

The United States also has begun to install 10- to 14-part multiple warheads on 496 of its 656 submarine-based missiles, all of which have a longer range than comparable single-warhead Russian weapons.

American officials say the large numbers of relatively small multiple warheads are designed to be able to overwhelm a potential, widespread missile defense and also to insure that enough weapons would survive a surprise attack to retaliate and destroy at least 25 per cent of the Soviet population and 50 per cent of its industry.

But the Russian build-up, which seems to date from just after the humiliating experience of being forced to remove nuclear missiles from Cuba, continues to grow unabatedly.

More than 90 very large Soviet ICBM silos, presumably for advanced missiles, have been started this year. And the main nuclear submarine building yard at Severodvinsk, on the White Sea, is being doubled in capacity, suggesting that Moscow will not be content at stopping at missile craft parity.

ABM

NEW YORK TIMES

16 OCT 1971

## Soviet Reports Building at Ship Center

By THEODORE SHABAD

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Oct. 15 — The Soviet Union said today that a major program of urban expansion was under way in a northern city that was recently identified as a nuclear-submarine center in a Washington dispatch on a reported build-up of Soviet strategic weapons.

Tass, the official press agency, issued a brief news item from the White Sea port of Severodvinsk, saying that four new residential neighborhoods, each housing 8,000 people, were under development on the western outskirts of the city of 145,000 population.

The seemingly innocuous 80-word dispatch dealt with a place that is rarely mentioned in the public information media of the Soviet Union.

Moreover, the news item was



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released only a few days after a Washington dispatch to The New York Times said that satellite photos of the Soviet Union had uncovered evidence of a build-up of more and better strategic weapons.

The build-up was said to include a doubling in size of the principal Soviet nuclear submarine construction yard at Severodvinsk. And some officials said it increased the need to insure at least a first-step arms control agreement as soon as possible.

The sequence of reports on United States satellite photographs and on the urban development program at the Soviet submarine center was not thought to be directly related. But at the very least they suggested an odd coincidence in view of the secrecy that surrounds Soviet defense industry.

The Soviet Government's press agency, it was felt, was unlikely to intentionally release information that could be interpreted as indirect support for United States intelligence findings.

It was thought more plausible, therefore, that Tass officials had not been aware of the Western report when they authorized publication of the

news item on Severodvinsk, on the surface one of many items in the Soviet press about urban improvement across this vast nation.

Available Soviet publications, in keeping with the customary rules covering military and other secret information, do not identify Severodvinsk as a submarine construction base. Nor do they provide any other specific industrial information. The Tass dispatch referred to it as a "large industrial and cultural center" of the Soviet Union's sub-Arctic regions.

Severodvinsk, whose population grew from 79,000 in 1959 to 145,000 last year, is probably the largest of a number of Soviet cities whose economic functions are not made public because of their strategic character. Some places, such as spacecraft-launching centers or nuclear-weapons sites, are omitted from Soviet maps for security reasons.

Two bits of published information about Severodvinsk provide a clue to its industrial activities. When founded in 1936, on the desolate White Sea shore 40 miles west of Arkhangelsk, it was known as Sudostroi, a name meaning "ship construction." Some Soviet reference books list a "shipbuilding technical school" among the city's educational institutions.

In 1938, when the town already had a population of about 20,000, its name was changed to Molotovsk. This was presumably to conceal its identity and at the same time honor Premier Vyacheslav M. Molotov, for whom many places in the Soviet Union had been named.

Mr. Molotov was removed in 1957 from all positions of power by Nikita S. Khrushchev, and cities named for the former Premier were renamed. The White Sea port became known as Severodvinsk, for the River Severnaya Dvina, or Northern Dvina, which empties into the White Sea nearby.



ABM

SAN DIEGO, CAL.

TRIBUNE

MAY 27 1971

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Russ missile

silos raise

buildup query

EVENING TRIBUNE News Report

WASHINGTON — The new missile silos under construction in the Soviet Union may be for two separate missile systems, a Defense Department spokesman said yesterday.

The spokesman, Jerry W. Friedheim, said new evidence gathered over the past month gives some indication the Russians may be involved in "two separate systems of silo improvement."

Friedheim suggested the silos could be for either new missiles, existing missiles or perhaps only represent an effort to harden silos against attack.

"We are not certain what the Soviets' intentions are," he said. "That remains our current assessment."

#### CIA reports

Meanwhile, Senate Republican sources reported that the Central Intelligence Agency has concluded that at least two-thirds of the new silos recently detected in the Soviet Union appear to have been prepared for the relatively small SS11 intercontinental ballistic missile rather than a large new weapon.

Over the past months U.S. intelligence has reported the Soviets were building 60 new missile silos, raising alarms that the Russians were embarked on a new missile program and seeking a first-strike capability.

Friedheim said the Pentagon was still unable to make any final determination of what the Russians were up to.

He said the new silo construction is continuing in areas of their existing missile complexes.

#### Stockpiles used

Meanwhile in Mittenwald, Germany, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird said Russia and the United States are adding to their nuclear missile stockpiles despite an agreement to talk about limiting them.

Both superpowers are maintaining conventional ground troops at present strength in central Europe, although Moscow now has indicated an interest in discussing mutual and balanced reductions of these forces.

Diplomats from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries will undertake exploratory talks with Moscow immediately in hope of learning within the next six to eight weeks whether the Russian interest is sincere, U.S. officials said.

#### Eight nations attend

These were the highlights of a two-day meeting of NATO's eight-nation nuclear planning group.

Manlio Brosio, secretary general of NATO, told a news conference the defense ministers comprising the nuclear planning group "are trying to prevent war before waging it."

"You cannot have a good preventive if you do not have a good deterrent," Brosio said.

26 MAY 1971

# Russia's New Missile Silos Considered Defensive by CIA

By JOHN W. FINNEY  
New York Times News Service

The Central Intelligence Agency has concluded that at least two-thirds of the large new silo holes detected in the Soviet Union are intended for the relatively small SS11 intercontinental missile and not for a large new weapon as has been suggested by the Defense Department.

This CIA assessment, reported yesterday by Senate Republican sources, casts a new and different light on Soviet strategic intentions at a crucial time in the negotiations to achieve some limitation on defensive and offensive strategic weapons.

## 60 Detected

Rather than seeking to achieve a first-strike capability against the United States with large new missiles—as was suggested by some officials after the detection of the large new missile holes—it now appears to some arms control specialists that the Soviet Union is following the U.S. course of trying to protect its missiles against attack with "hardened" silos.

Some 60 large new missile silos have been detected through reconnaissance satellites in recent months in the Soviet Union. The CIA was said to have concluded that at least two thirds were intended for the SS11 intercontinental missile, which is comparable to the U.S. Minuteman ICBM. More specifically, some non-governmental sources with access to CIA intelligence information said all but 15 of the new holes were located in existing SS11 missile fields.

## Informants Not Identified

The Senate GOP sources said they had been informed by non-governmental arms control experts who, in turn, had been briefed by the CIA. Out of a concern not to offend the Nixon

administration, these Republican sources declined to be identified by name.

The Defense Department declined to comment on the reported CIA assessment because, as a spokesman put it, "We would not have any comment on a

speculative report like that." But the spokesman said the Pentagon still held to the interpretation that the Soviet Union was deploying a modified version of its large SS9 intercontinental missile or an entirely new missile system.

10 MAY 1971

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ARM

BY STEWART ALSOP



## WHAT'S GOING IN THE HOLES?

**WASHINGTON**—In recent weeks, a shudder of uneasiness has passed through the tiny community of people who know, and care, about the nuclear-strategic balance between this country and the Soviet Union. The uneasiness has been reflected in veiled hints from Secretary of Defense Laird, Senator Jackson and others. It is important to understand the realities that lie behind the hints.

Until a few months ago, when the Russians were installing one of their huge, 25-megaton SS-9 missiles, they always went about the business in precisely the same way. First they would build two fences, sometimes three, around a 100-acre site. Then they would dig a big, flat hole, about 100 feet across and 25 feet deep. This hole, easily detectable to the all-seeing eyes of the intelligence satellites, was always a signal to the intelligence analysts that another SS-9 was going on.

Inside the first hole, the Russians would then dig another, deeper, hole, about 30 feet across and 120 feet down. They would line the hole with concrete, put a steel liner inside that and then lower the big missile into the liner. In the remaining empty space of the first big hole, they would build a complex of work rooms, generators, fuel pumps and so on, and cover the whole thing with a thick, steel sliding door.

Then they were in business, with an operational weapon about twenty times as powerful as the American Minuteman missile. Between 1965, when they planted their first SS-9, and last autumn, the Russians had gone through this procedure in precisely the same way again and again, installing some 275 SS-9 missiles.

### WORK STOPS

Last autumn, digging had started on eighteen more SS-9 sites, and the intelligence analysts assumed that the Russians would soon raise SS-9 deployment to more than 300. Then, in October, work on these eighteen holes stopped, totally and abruptly—the empty holes are still there, easily visible in the satellite photographs.

Perhaps, it was thought, this was good news. Perhaps it was a signal from the Russians that they were serious about limiting strategic weapons through the SALT talks. But then something happened to cause the shudder. The Russians started building a new kind of hole. This new kind of hole is about

the same size as the second, deep hole that houses the SS-9—but it lacks the first, big, shallow hole.

These different holes have been dug at a furious pace—41 of them at last count, suggesting that the schedule calls for at least 70 a year. The holes have been dug among the six existing SS-9 complexes in South Central Russia, and they could be for some new kind of point-defense anti-missile missile. But the experts think the odds are heavy that the holes are, instead, for inter-continental missiles.

### TESTS CONDUCTED

At about the same time the Soviets stopped construction on the eighteen SS-9 holes, they conducted a series of 21 tests of their MRV's—multiple re-entry vehicles. The Russian MRV's, controlled by a rather primitive but effective system of pointing rails, are designed to fall in a predetermined fixed pattern on their targets—the primary targets, the experts unanimously believe, being the thousand U.S. Minuteman missiles that constitute our chief nuclear deterrent.

Because the pattern is fixed, the MRV's are relatively vulnerable to our now-building ABM system. But two of the 21 tests appeared to be, not MRV's, but MIRV's—multiple, *independently targeted*, re-entry vehicles. The MIRV's would be far less vulnerable to a missile defense—it was to counter the expanding Soviet ABM system that our Minuteman 3 and Poseidon missiles were equipped with MIRV's.

It is possible that the two seeming MIRV's were simply malfunctioning MRV's. Perhaps the Soviets are simply redesigning their SS-9 configuration—the upper hole and its contents are more vulnerable to a near miss than the missile itself, despite the steel door. But if this is the case, certain questions remain unanswered.

Why should the Russians wholly abandon the eighteen SS-9 holes and start digging new and different holes? Why not simply move the contents of the upper hole to another place? And why the extraordinary haste to dig the new holes?

The experts have a working hypothesis to answer these questions—that the new holes are for a newly designed, multi-MIRVed missile, at least as powerful as the SS-9. If the hypothesis is correct, the MIRV's will almost certainly be used in the near future, since the 25-megaton SS-9 warhead

provides a much bigger nuclear pie to slice, as it were, than the 1-megaton Minuteman. The new missile could be ten-MIRVed, or twelve-MIRVed, or more, but the usual guess is that it will be six-MIRVed. A six-MIRVed SS-9-sized missile would provide six nuclear warheads each more powerful—about a megaton and a half—than a single Minuteman warhead.

If a multi-MIRVed, 25-megaton Soviet missile is what is going to be put into those new holes, that means the end of our Minuteman complex as a credible nuclear deterrent, perhaps within three years, or even two. The peculiar nuclear mathematics make that almost totally predictable. If the Russians are as methodical as usual, we shall know what is going into the new holes by next autumn. According to the almost unvarying Soviet schedule, that will be the time for operational testing of the new missile—if that is what it is.

There is another fact to be considered. In March, the Russians successfully completed their third test series of a non-nuclear satellite intercept vehicle. These then are the facts that have caused the shudder—and they *are* facts, for the intelligence in those matters is now absolutely "hard." No one will know, until or unless the Soviets test a new missile, just what these facts mean. But any reader of detective stories will discern a pattern of clues, all pointing in the same direction.

### A SOVIET CAPABILITY?

The Soviets are bargaining at the SALT talks for eliminating ABM protection for the Minuteman deterrent complex. At the same time, they have probably already achieved the capability (which we lack against them) to blind our intelligence satellites. And the experts are betting about 2 to 1 that they are also on the way to achieving the capability to knock out, with very powerful multi-MIRVed missiles, our land-based nuclear deterrent.

In short, the available clues suggest that the Russians are now going all-out to achieve in the near future a really decisive nuclear-strategic superiority. This is no cause for panic—it does not mean that the Russians are plotting to knock out the U.S. in a first strike. Even so, serious people do have a duty to examine the facts seriously, without ducking behind the currently fashionable idea of "peace through dialogue" and the military-industrial complex.

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ABM

## Asks U.S.-Soviet Halt for a Year

# Jackson Urges Missile Freeze

By Chalmers M. Roberts  
 Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) yesterday proposed an immediate one-year freeze in deployment of the most important Soviet and American land-based missile systems.

The senator, whose views are close to those of the Nixon administration, made public on ABC's television program, "Is-

sues and Answers" (WMAL), the proposal he will make in a Senate speech today. Aides said, however, he had not discussed it with the administration.

His proposal was in sharp contrast to one made last week by his fellow Democrat who is a possible 1972 presidential nominee, Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (Minn.). Both pro-

posals are reflective of alarm in Washington over the deadlock at the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and over new reports of Soviet missile development.

In the four meetings thus far of the current Vienna round of SALT the United States has found itself on the defensive in the face of a Soviet proposal made last December for an initial agreement to limit rival anti-missile (ABM) systems.

Humphrey last Thursday in a Senate speech, in effect, advocated accepting the Soviet offer provided it is linked to later success in negotiating a limitation on offensive missiles.

But Jackson termed the Soviet proposal "completely unacceptable." Instead he offered this four-part one-year plan:

1. "The United States would immediately halt the deployment of Minuteman III missiles with their MIRV (multiple) warheads." The first 50 of these missiles were converted to MIRV warheads last year, and the program calls for 550 such Minuteman IIIs.

2. "The Soviet Union would immediately halt the deployment of new ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) launchers and missiles including those now under construction."

### Based on Photos

That latter phrase refers to what Jackson yesterday again called a "new" Soviet missile

system, a judgment based on reconnaissance photos of new silo construction in both European Russia and Siberia. Jackson added that the Soviets have the "ability" to deploy 60 to 70 of what he termed "such huge SS-9 type missiles" this year.

Deployment of 70, he said, would "put into serious question the credibility of our second strike force." The Soviets now have around 290 of the

SS-9s, a giant missile capable of holding a 25 megaton warhead.

3. "Both countries would retain the freedom to assure the survivability of their strategic land-based forces so long as they did not add to their offensive potential." Jackson explained that by this he meant the right to further "harden" missile silos with more concrete and steel.

4. "Neither side would deploy a population-defending ABM. Jackson, like the Nixon administration, considers the American Safeguard ABM system as a "light" rather than a "thick" or population defense. But the Soviet Union at the SALT talks has indicated worry that Safeguard could become a thick system.

Jackson's alarm about the new Soviet silos is shared by the administration although thus far there is no agreed administration intelligence estimate as to just what the Soviet Union is up to. Work on new SS-9 silos, somewhat halted for some months. The new silo work was first photographed in early February.

### Free to Continue

Jackson was careful to point out that under his proposal the United States would be free to continue deployment of what he called "the much

smaller warheads of the MIRVed Poseidon missile on our Polaris submarines." The first such Poseidon sub will go to sea this spring and 31 of 41 Polaris subs are to be refitted to take the new MIRVed missile.

Thus far, the Soviet Union,

as far as is known, has not deployed multiple warheads on either its land-based or sea-based missiles although MIRV testing has been going on for some time.

Humphrey called for suspension of deployment of both Safeguard and MIRVs on Minutemen and, in return, called on the Soviet Union to suspend its own land-based missile program and its MIRV testing.

But Jackson, like the administration, would have no part of an ABM freeze. He argued that the Soviet proposal "would accelerate the decline" in the stability of the existing balance of nuclear terror.

President Nixon has publicly rejected the "ABMs only"

proposal by Moscow, declaring that any SALT agreement must have "some mix" of both offensive and defensive weapons systems. However,

many arms control experts outside the government and some in Congress favor the "ABMs only" approach as a beginning.

To encourage Soviet acceptance of "some mix" the administration has gone to Vienna with a trimmed down proposal. What has been eliminated are what are termed corollary conditions for limiting rival ICBMs. Essentially this means the United States is asking only that the Soviets accept a numerical ceiling of around 2,000 missiles for each superpower.

This number, however, would include a sub-ceiling by number for missiles over a certain size, a provision designed to limit the SS-9s that also would limit whatever the Soviets intend to put into the new, larger silos now being built.

One reason for the strong administration resistance to an "ABMs only" agreement is pragmatic. It is feared in high administration circles that if there were such an agreement it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to get from Congress the money to either complete the initial Safeguard phases now under construction near Minuteman sites in Montana and North Dakota or to protect Washington if there were an agreement limiting ABMs to the Washington and Moscow areas.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

DATE 29 MAR 71 PAGE 9

## A MISSILE FREEZE URGED BY JACKSON

Senator Calls for One-Year  
Halt by U.S. and Soviet

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 28—Senator Henry M. Jackson proposed today a one-year agreement with the Soviet Union freezing the deployment of most land-based missiles. He said this would "arrest the decline in the security" of the United States nuclear deterrent.

The Washington Democrat, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee who has been mentioned as a potential Presidential candidate, called for an immediate agreement that would halt the deployment of United States Minuteman III



Associated Press

Senator Henry M. Jackson  
on TV show yesterday.

missiles with multiple warheads, as well as the deployment and construction of new Soviet intercontinental missiles and launchers and installation of antiballistic systems defending population centers.

Appearing on "Issues and Answers," a radio and television program of the American Broadcasting Company, Senator Jackson announced that he would outline his proposal in a

He said such an agreement was necessary because the Soviet had started building "a massive system that involves the deployment of an ICBM [inter-continental ballistic missile] force that exceeds 25 megatons."

### Earlier Disclosure

It was Senator Jackson who disclosed three weeks ago that the United States had detected the new Soviet construction effort. This was later confirmed by the Defense Department.

Today, he said, "The Russians have an ability this year—and this is what is ominous—to deploy between 60 and 70 of such huge SS-9 type missiles."

"If they should deploy 70 of such missiles," he said, "they would have a capability this year alone of adding more megatonnage, or destructive power than we have in our entire current land-based Minutemen ICBM system."

On Feb. 25, President Nixon said in his State of the World Message that the growth of Soviet strategic forces "leads inescapably to profound questions concerning the threats we will face in the future, and the adequacy of our current strategic forces to meet the requirements of our security."

Mr. Nixon stressed that during 1970 the Soviet Union had further increased its lead over the United States in the deployment of intercontinental missiles. At the end of last year, he said, the Soviet Union had 1,440 ICM's and the United States 1,054.

Senator Jackson's appeal for a freeze came amid growing concern over the new Soviet strategic arms programs and the apparent stalemate at the talks in Vienna on bombing strategic arms.

### Humphrey Asks Moratorium

In a major Senate speech last Thursday, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Minnesota Democrat, another potential Presidential candidate, introduced a resolution calling for a mutual moratorium on deployments of offensive and defensive weapons and MIRV testing while the U. S. and the Soviet Union negotiated a ban on antiballistic systems.

Senator Humphrey criticized the Administration for insisting on a comprehensive agreement with Moscow on both offensive and defensive weapons, and suggested that an antiballistic accord come first.

The Senate disarmament subcommittee, headed by Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, the leading Democratic Presidential contender, is scheduled to start closed door briefings this week on the status of the Arms-Limitation Talks and the Soviet threat.

During his television appearance, Senator Jackson said that in the talks with the Russians, resumed in Vienna on March 15, "the real problem that we face is that, the Russians appear to be going ahead on an unabated basis with a very large offensive land-based system."

He said the new Soviet activities "would put into serious question the credibility of our second-strike force" and that "if the Russians continue to deploy these huge offensive systems we will have to take another look at our whole deterrent posture" and "at the need for more offensive systems."

ABM

THE NEW YORK TIMES

DATE 27 MAR 71 PAGE 1

# Soviet Missile Site Pattern Called Hint of New System

By TAD SZULC  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 26—United States officials said today that the pattern of recent construction of intercontinental missile sites in the Soviet Union might presage the deployment of a new Soviet offensive-weapon system.

United States observation of new construction by the Russians, first detected last December, has shown about 20 holes large enough to accommodate the Soviet SS-9, the largest intercontinental ballistic missile in existence, or even bigger weapons, these officials said.

New information available to the United States has also shown that the recently dug holes are distributed in five clusters along the wide arc forming the Soviet offensive missile system. This stretches from the Polish border to the Chinese frontier.

This extensive deployment pattern is increasingly suggesting to United States specialists that the Soviet Union may indeed be building a new weapons system. This might be related to improved SS-9's, or still newer missiles, equipped with accurate MIRV's, or multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

The White House is understood to be proceeding on the assumption that the new con-

struction is related to Soviet development of the multiple-warhead MIRV's.

An explanation of the new construction was requested last week by American representatives at the talks in Vienna on limiting strategic arms. The Soviet delegation has not replied, officials here said.

As detailed information from satellite observation has been obtained in recent weeks, the Nixon Administration was reported to be chiefly concerned with the long-range potential of new Soviet missile deployment rather than with the present size of missile stockpiles.

Since it takes about 18

Continued on Page 10, Column 4

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

months from the start of construction until a missile site is operational, the White House is believed to be thinking of the nuclear parity problem that will exist by the middle of 1972—with the assumption that the Soviet multiple-warhead will then have become operational.

United States intelligence officials are aware that the Soviet Union is testing MIRV warheads, but do not know how

When the talks resumed March 15, after a three-month recess, the United States was awaiting an answer to its inquiries about the meaning of the cessation of work on three of six new SS-9 sites.

Officials said today that construction of these three silos remained halted and they speculated that the sites might have been abandoned in favor of a new system connected to the approximately 20 new holes observed in recent months. The new holes, officials said, are in locations different from those of the three silos on which work was stopped.

## Signal Suspected

After American intelligence agencies spotted the halt in the installation of the three silos — information indicated that some of them might have been dismantled — the Nixon Administration publicly wondered whether this was a signal that the Soviet Union might be amenable to a slowdown in the deployment of offensive weapons.

In his State of the World Message on Feb. 25, President Nixon expressed hope for a slowdown. The United States position in the talks to limit arms is that an agreement with the Soviet Union must cover both offensive and defensive weapons and not only defensive ones, as proposed by Moscow.

The first public disclosure of the new Soviet construction was made on March 7 by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, in a television appearance. It was confirmed the same day by the Pentagon spokesman, Jerry W. Friedheim, who said that "it is correct that we have detected some new ICBM construction in the Soviet Union" but that

"we are not sure exactly what it is or what the Soviets' intentions are."

Since then, however, additional observation by satellite has provided the United States with more detailed information on the number of the new holes and their deployment pattern.

This knowledge, officials said, has increasingly inclined the Administration to consider the possibility that the Soviet Union may be working on a new weapons system.

They added that such a new system might indicate installation of missiles even larger than the SS-9, conversion of the SS-9 from liquid to solid fuel or an altogether new generation of weapons.

The conversion of the SS-9

to solid fuel, which would be a major technological achievement, would give the missile a propellant that could be instantly ignited. The use of liquid fuel forces some missiles to be maintained in constant readiness, a costly and dangerous procedure.

Solid fuel also provides greater thrust per unit of weight of propellant.

Officials here also reported that no meaningful progress had been achieved in the Vienna talks in the last 10 days.

They said that while the Soviet delegation had indicated its willingness in principle to discuss an agreement on defensive and offensive nuclear weapons, it still insisted that an accord be reached first on defensive systems.



## Reds Held Testing 'Hunter' Satellites

By George C. Wilson  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Flight paths of two recently launched Soviet satellites indicate a new test of a system to knock out unfriendly space vehicles.

The two Russian satellites, designated Cosmos 394 and 397, also may have been sent up from a different spaceport than the two previous shots, one in 1968 and the other in 1970.

Space specialists theorized yesterday that the Soviet Union used the military complex at Plesetsk rather than the more civilian spaceport of Tyuratam.

If further analysis substantiates that theory, the change of spaceports probably means that the Soviet Union considers its satellite inspection system in the operational rather than experimental category.

Part of the basis for suspecting a different launching site is the change in the inclination of the Soviet spacecraft this time as they crossed the Equator.

Cosmos 394—launched Feb. 9—crossed at an inclination of 65.9 degrees and Cosmos 397—launched Feb. 25—crossed at 65.8 degrees. This compares with an inclination of about 62 degrees for previous satellite inspection lasts from Tyuratam.

The Soviet Union in all three series of shots used "target" and "hunter" satellites. The radar track showed the hunters passing close enough to the target satellites to blow them up—apparently testing the ability to knock out another nation's observation or navigation satellites.

In this new shot, Cosmos 394 flew a nearly circular orbit about 370 miles above the earth. The hunter—Cosmos 397—flew an elliptical course, zooming up as high as 1,390 miles and down as low as 368 miles.

In the two earlier experiments—the first beginning on Oct. 19, 1968, and the second on Oct. 20, 1970—three satel-

lites were used, two of them hunters. It appears that only two were used in this latest test.

American radars in those two earlier marksmanship exercises detected debris from explosions in the hunters, with space specialists unsure whether the target satellite shot the hunters or vice-versa.

Although the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Department study such Soviet shots intensively, very little information is released to the public. But a recent Library of Congress report commented on the satellite inspection nature of the 1968 and 1970 tests.

"Two successive flights made a reasonably close intercept of a predecessor," wrote Charles S. Sheldon II in the Library of Congress report of Jan. 12, "and then moving away a bit, were in turn exploded into many pieces of debris."

"In the absence of Soviet announcements," Sheldon continued, "an assessment cannot be conclusive. But the suspicion remains that a capability to inspect and destroy satellites had been created."

7 MARCH 1971

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# Stalking Red Subs In U.S. Waters

By GEORGE C. WILSON

Miami Herald-Washington Post Wire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy, which for years has been keeping track of Soviet submarines all over the world, now is afraid of losing them in America's own back yard — the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean.

This concern underlies the recent White House warnings to the Soviet Union that the United States would view a Russian submarine base in Cuba "with the utmost seriousness."

The prospect that Soviet nuclear-powered submarines — armed with either missiles or torpedoes — could sneak into the Gulf undetected has prompted the Navy to order a special study on how to monitor submarines around Cuba.

It has also raised challenges to the way the Navy spends its \$3 billion a year for anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Some Defense specialists charge the aircraft, ship and submarine branches of the Navy are concentrating more on getting ASW money for themselves than on coming up with a coordinated approach to the submarine threat.

Another argument heard is that the civilian leadership of the Pentagon has allowed Vice Adm. H.G. Rickover to go his own way in building a new fleet of high-speed submarines at the expense of slower but quieter subs that have the best chance of finding and destroying an enemy sub in wartime.

ONE IRONY is that today's Navy is more prepared to find and track Soviet submarines sailing off Reykjavik, Iceland, than off New Orleans. It happens that New Orleans — which Soviet subs might approach undetected for lack of any ASW barrier — is part of the home district of Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D), new chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, which passes on Navy spending.

Soviet submarines entering the Gulf of Mexico from south of Cuba catch the U.S. Navy on its deaf side. The Navy has underwater micro-

phones on the ocean bottom for listening to Soviet submarines sailing southward from Reykjavik along the east coast of the U.S., but not for the waters behind Cuba and along America's Gulf coast.

The new Navy study, to be completed in April, is focusing on what kind of "fence" should be put up against Soviet subs so close to the U.S. — some version of underwater caves-droppers or a barrier of surface ships, aircraft and killer submarines which patrolled the Gulf and the Caribbean on a regular basis.

Not that ASW barriers would keep the expanding Soviet navy out of those waters — any more than the U.S. stays out of the Mediterranean. But the Navy at least wants to keep track of Soviet movements around Cuba.

REAR ADM. John D. Haynes (Ret.), for one, contends the new "Soviet naval forays" into the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea "are the most pregnant events in U.S. foreign relations since World War II — and this is not forgetting the nuclear explosions, two bloody wars and the Cuban crisis of October, 1962."

He complains that the U.S. government "has been less than entirely frank" in explaining to the people "this sea power phenomenon at their immediate door."

The present \$3 billion-a-year ASW effort encompasses underwater listening systems, submarine hunting surface ships, planes, helicopters and killer submarines.

Alain C. Enthoven, once the Pentagon's top whiz kid as former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara's chief of systems analysis, questioned whether the nation was getting its money's worth from the ASW investment.

"OUR EFFORT to come up with a convincing analysis of ASW forces, one that everyone would accept and agree upon, failed," Enthoven and K.

Wayne Smith wrote in their book, *How Much Is Enough?*

"It failed, in part," they wrote, "because the U.S. Navy is made up of three competing branches, each proud of its own capabilities and traditions: A submarine navy, a surface navy and an aircraft navy."

"When it came time to gather assumptions on which to base the PK's (probabilities of killing enemy submarine) of the various Navy forces, each branch competed with the others in overstating performance claims for its own preferred weapon systems."

"Each feared that if it did not," Enthoven and Smith continued, "future studies would show that all or most of the Soviet submarine force was being destroyed by one of the other branches, which might then get more of the total Navy budget . . ."

THE RESULT, the authors said, was that the Navy's own studies showed it could handle the Soviet submarine threat with ease — often "with even smaller forces" than already existed for ASW.

"The dilemma was reflected in the fact that, for four years in a row (1963-66), the Secretary of Defense asked the Navy to make an analysis of anti-submarine warfare which could be used as a basis for judgments on force levels and that, for four years in a row, the Navy made a

study, got caught up in the same dilemma, and ended up disowning its own analysis as a basis for determining force levels."

Enthoven and Smith also charged that the Navy tailored its war gaming to fit its desires for hardware — claiming in 1967, for example, that a new carrier-based ASW plane (the VSX) was needed because Soviet submarines would be far at sea by the time war broke out.

"A year later, with the VSX project approved," the Navy produced "a massive study" to show it had to buy more submarines so "it could catch Soviet subs as they tried to leave port in wartime — an opposite set of assumptions."

Navy leaders in interviews said such charges are unfair, that they have to cover all the possibilities in ASW to insure the nation's security, that ASW spending will have to rise to keep abreast of undersea technology.

They regard the Soviet forays into the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean as a new bet for the Navy to cover. But the new Cuban threat is already bringing a demand in some government circles for a re-ordering of the Navy's priorities — not just changes in ASW forces.

"They ought to give up this silly idea of sending a fleet into the Indian Ocean and concentrate on the real naval problem right here at home," said one government planner.

THE STRATEGIC implications of the current controversy are illustrated by following a Soviet submarine on a cruise from the Russian port of Murmansk to the Cuban port of Cienfuegos. While mythical, the cruise described illustrates the challenge of Cienfuegos.

The submarine sails submerged through the icy waters of the Barents Sea, rounding the North Cape of Norway as it heads south toward Cuba.

Off the North Cape, on a typical deployment, American submarines lie silently in the depths. They listen to the traffic going by. Each submarine makes a slightly different sound underwater, its "signature." The American sub may well recognize the signature and identify the sub it cannot see.

Once the Soviet sub passes out of sound range, the American sub could radio ahead to other monitors — like a cop watching for speeders from behind a billboard. Another "submarine cop" farther south is the force of the P-3 anti-submarine-warfare airplanes based at Reykjavik.

THE SEAWAY narrows in that area, with Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom the figurative stop-

ping stones. ASW forces which can be stretched across the sea from those points constitute the UKGI barrier — for the United Kingdom, Greenland and Iceland participation.

If the Soviet sub went through the UKGI barrier at a time an elaborate ASW drill was programmed, American submarines would team up with airplanes from both land bases and aircraft carriers, helicopters and destroyers to locate the Russian sub.

There are active and passive systems for detecting the submarine. Active systems include sound waves sent under the water. They bounce back when they hit a submarine, indicating its position. Passive systems just listen to the sounds made by the submarine itself.

South of the UKGI barrier, the Soviet sub runs through another barrier — the so-called Sousus system of underwater microphones stretched out on the ocean bottom along the American east coast.

IN PEACETIME, the idea is to watch Soviet submarine deployments around the world so policy makers in Washington can be forewarned of any threatening-looking activity.

Sousus or any other passive listening system is not foolproof. The submarine can hide its noise behind mountains under the sea or under thermal layers of water.

Nevertheless, Sousus can hear Soviet submarines before they get within missile range of the American east coast.

But behind Cuba is a different matter.

ONCE the Soviet submarine on this mythical trip has swung around Cuba, she cannot be heard by the east coast Sousus. There are plenty of places behind Cuba for a submarine to hide. Conceivably the Soviet sub could sail out of Cienfuegos into the Caribbean and sneak up into the Gulf of Mexico undetected. There is no Sousus barrier in the Gulf.

In wartime, a Soviet Polaris-type sub in the Gulf could shoot missiles at American bomber bases from the waters off New Orleans. An anti-ship type submarine would threaten the vital ports and sea lanes of the crowded Gulf. The Caribbean would be open to Soviet subs out of Cuba.

The Soviets, in July, 1969, sent the first of three naval forces into the Gulf of Mexico. Adm. Hayes, in his article in the January "Interplay" magazine, called this expedition "the first time that warships of a foreign power with less than friendly intent had been in the Gulf since the French invasion of Mexico during the American Civil War, and in the Caribbean since the Spanish fleet of 1898."

Seven Soviet warships on that first Soviet cruise were joined by a nuclear-powered submarine in the Gulf for ASW exercises, about 300 miles off the mouth of the Mississippi River. The submarine was armed with torpedoes, not missiles, according to reports at the time.

IN MAY and June of 1970, a second force of Soviet ships sailed into Cienfuegos during the world-wide sea exercise called "Okean." This time, according to Adm. Hayes, the nuclear submarine carried the Shaddock 200-mile-range surface-to-surface missile.

The third Soviet foray entered the Caribbean in September, 1970, mooring in Cienfuegos. This time there was no sign of a submarine, but a submarine tender was among the ships docking there.

Thus, President Nixon last fall had to worry about the Soviet Union building facilities for missile-carrying submarines in Cuba — just eight years after President Kennedy went through the nerve-racking missile crisis with Premier Nikita Khrushchev. The Nixon Administration's public warnings to Russia started on Sept. 25, 1970.

"The Soviet Union can be under no doubt that we would view the establishment of a strategic base in the Caribbean with the utmost seriousness," a White House official said back then. A Pentagon spokesman, also on Sept. 25, said the U.S. "can't rule out" the possibility of the Soviet Union building a base for its Yankee (Polaris type) submarines in Cuba.

THE STATE Department, on Nov. 13 and 18, said that an "understanding" had been reached with the Soviet Union in October. It seemed to bar servicing nuclear submarines in Cuban ports, but the exact terms of the unwritten understanding have not been made public. So it is not known whether just nuclear-powered Polaris type submarines — which constitute "offensive weapons" — were barred or all type of nuclear submarines. Diesel-powered submarines evidently are allowed in the Caribbean and Gulf under the "understanding."

Further, there apparently is no ban on a Soviet sub tender being based in Cienfuegos and sailing out of there regularly to service Russian submarines in international waters.

Vice Adm. Turner F. Caldwell is in charge of keeping track of Soviet submarines, whether they are sailing off Washington, D.C., or New Orleans.

Having to keep track of Soviet submarines around Cuba — where the mountainous terrain under the Caribbean makes it easy to hide and the thermal layers in the shallows of

kind of cover -- could not help but "dilute" the Navy's existing ASW forces, Caldwell said.

NAVY LEADERS declined to speculate on what kind of "barrier," if any, the Navy will stretch across Florida, Cuba and Yucatan to guard the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico. But some kind of sound detection is virtually certain to be at the heart of the system.

"Underwater sound is still the big means of detection," Caldwell said. This is why the Navy watches worriedly as Soviet submarines become progressively quieter.

Another Pentagon ASW specialist -- in discussing existing and planned ASW forces -- maintained the Navy is not putting enough money into quietness on submarines. "It will be the quietest sub, not the fastest, who wins in a life-or-death contest," he said.

Vice Adm. H. G. Rickover in 1953 won the argument with John S. Foster Jr., director of Pentagon research, on whether to plunge ahead with construction of high-speed submarines -- using the type of nuclear plant already installed on a Navy warship.

In contrast to the single "quiet" submarine under construction, the Navy intends to build 32 of Rickover's high-speed attack submarines at an estimated cost of \$5.75 billion. Critics contend these subs do not represent enough improvement in speed or quietness over present submarines to justify the huge cost. Rickover contends more speed is crucial to combat the Soviet undersea threat.

THE NAVY plans other heavy investments in ASW airplanes -- about

Sound is still the big means of detection. That's why the Navy watches worriedly as Soviet submarines become progressively quieter.

\$2 billion for 103 carrier-based S-3 airplanes and \$2.5 billion for 192 land-based P-3C planes.

In addition, the new 963 class of Spruance destroyers are designed for ASW -- although not exclusively. The Navy intends to build 30 of the ships at a cost of \$2.1 billion.

Besides the new ASW weaponry, billions are earmarked for new anti-submarine warfare ships, the USS A-10 and 48.

One of the few possible reductions in sight on ASW spending may come from the Navy decision to use the same aircraft carrier for both ASW and attack aircraft, rather than the present practice of separate carriers for each. The experiment will start in earnest with the next cruise of the carrier Saratoga this spring.

With such a highly visible Soviet submarine threat surfacing off Cuba, Congress is unlikely to cut ASW funds. But the lawmakers this year are expected to raise fundamental questions about policies governing the grim contest under the sea.

ABM

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BY STEWART ALSOP



## WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

WASHINGTON—President Nixon, like all modern Presidents, is the target of a continuous bombardment of intelligence reports. Recently, three reports he has received must have caused the President to stop and think—and then think again. These reports, which to most readers will seem of passing interest—if any at all—may be summarized about as follows:

1. There is evidence, as yet inconclusive, that the Soviets intend to six-MIRV their 300-plus SS-9s. In other words, the huge intercontinental missiles are to be equipped with six independently targeted warheads, rather than three, as previously expected.
2. Last October, the Soviets carried out an eleven-day series of tests whose purpose was to make it possible to destroy intelligence satellites over Soviet territory, without using nuclear warheads. Similar, less sophisticated tests had been carried out in 1968.
3. Several prototypes of the Foxbat (U.S. code name) aircraft have been tested in Russia, and the plane is now believed to be in line production. The Foxbat is unquestionably the best aircraft of its kind in the world.

To most readers all this no doubt sounds like cold-war gobbledegook. But it is sometimes useful to try to put yourself in the President's shoes. For a nuclear-age President's first concern has to be the actual physical survival of the United States as a functioning society. Thus a President, unlike the rest of us, cannot afford to duck into the nearest intellectual foxhole, muttering comforting clichés about Pentagon propaganda or the horrid old military-industrial complex.

A President has to take serious intelligence, like the three items listed above, seriously. These three items go right to the heart of the great decision now confronting President Nixon—how to respond to the latest Russian proposal in the SALT talks.

In the last meetings in Helsinki, which ended in December, the Russians put on the table a reasonable-sounding proposal for eliminating all ABM's except those in the Moscow and Washington areas. Distinguished scientists and influential editorialists have passionately urged the President to give this proposal a positive response, when the talks resume in Vienna in March. To do so would certainly be politically popular. Moreover, any

agreement which might tend to slow or halt the arms race would obviously be in our interest, and the world's.

And yet—and yet. Put yourself in the President's shoes, and consider those three items of intelligence. The Soviet SS-9 is a "counterforce" weapon. Its only logical use is against our Minuteman missile complex—the SS-11 and other Soviet weapons are quite adequate to destroy our great cities. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has announced that the Soviets, having deployed about 300 SS-9s, seem to have slowed or halted deployment.

This could be good news. It could be a signal from the Soviets that they are serious about a SALT agreement. But if the intelligence about the six-MIRVed SS-9 is correct, it could be the very opposite of good news.

The Pentagon's chief scientist, John Foster, has assured Congress that our Minuteman retaliatory force will not be seriously threatened until or unless the Soviet SS-9 force reaches about 420 missiles. This assurance was based on complex mathematical computations, plus an assumption—the assumption that the SS-9s would be triple-MIRVed, as our much less powerful Minuteman III missiles are.

But the SS-9 has an immense warhead—roughly 25 megatons as against the Minuteman's 1 megaton. This very high yield reduces the accuracy requirement. For example, if the SS-9 were triple-MIRVed, each vehicle would have a warhead of about 5 megatons, and a CEP (circular error probable) of about 440 yards would be required. With six MIRV's each warhead would have a yield of about 1 megaton, and a CEP of about 300 yards would be required to destroy a Minuteman in its concrete silo.

### ARITHMETIC

If the Soviets are going for a six-MIRVed SS-9, this would mean that they are confident they can build a 300-yard CEP into their SS-9s. This in turn would mean that they would need no more than 300 SS-9s, to knock out the U.S. Minuteman complex of just over 1,000 missiles, in a first strike.

This arithmetic may seem insane, something for Dr. Strangelove. But a President in the nuclear age has to consider the insane arithmetic. He also has to consider the meaning of those satellite intercept tests.

Suppose there were a crisis as dangerous as the Cuban missile crisis—or more so. Suppose this President, or his successor, knew, or suspected, that the six-MIRVed Soviet SS-9s were capable of knocking out our whole land-based retaliatory force in a first strike. Suppose that, in this time of crisis, one of our Samos intelligence satellites simply disappeared. If it were knocked out by a nuclear warhead, this would be in flat contravention of the test-ban treaty, and very close to an act of war. But suppose it has just disappeared.

### STRANGELOVIAN

Suppose a second Samos has disappeared also. What then? The obvious answer would be to send over the Soviet land mass an SR-71 reconnaissance plane—the supersonic, very high altitude SR-71 is the modern descendant of Francis Gary Powers's U-2. But here the third item of intelligence has to be considered. The Foxbat is specifically designed to knock out, not only the comparatively slow and low-flying B-52s, but the SR-71s too.

So the SR-71 disappears too. The U.S. is like Samson, a blind giant. What then? Does the blind giant pull down the temple of civilization?

After the Cuban missile crisis, Russian diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov, meeting with John J. McCloy, who was acting as President Kennedy's personal representative, confirmed Khrushchev's decision to withdraw the Cuban missiles, and then added a comment: "This is the last time you Americans will be able to do this to us."

During the Cuban missile crisis the strategic advantage favored the United States, by a ratio of about six to one. Kuznetsov's comment was a clear warning that the Soviets meant to reverse the odds, and they have been working away doggedly to do so ever since. If the President accepted the Soviet SALT proposal—and if the intelligence cited above is accurate—the odds might indeed be reversed.

It is easy for a bystander to dismiss this sort of thing as a Strangelovian nightmare, and to take comfort in the uncomfoting fact that the United States will always presumably have what it takes to destroy the Soviet Union if the United States is willing to be destroyed. But the President of the United States is not a bystander. What would you do, if you were in his shoes?

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# Russians Reportedly Halt ICBM Buildup

## Construction Stopped on 6 Underground SS-9 Silos, Well-Informed U.S. Aides Say

BY MICHAEL GETLER

Exclusive to The Times from the Washington Post

WASHINGTON — The Soviet Union has halted construction on six underground silos for its huge SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile, well-informed U.S. officials report.

The stop in construction work was spotted recently by Air Force photo reconnaissance satellites orbiting over Russia and is now being reflected in the latest U.S. intelligence estimates, these sources say.

Work reportedly was still under way at these sites three months ago.

The new information comes at a time when the Nixon Administration is debating the stance it will take when the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviets resume in Vienna on March 15.

This most recent intelligence estimate is the second one within the past two months which reflects apparent continuing cutbacks by the Russians in the SS-9 buildup which got under way in 1964 and continued, with occasional pauses, through mid-1970.

### First Slowdown

As recently as last Oct. 9, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird publicly credited the Kremlin with "more than 300 SS-9s," including those already deployed plus others for which underground silos were still being prepared.

In December, however, the Pentagon confirmed press reports that a slowdown had been spotted in Russian SS-9 activity.

Informed government sources at that time said privately that work had stopped at 12 of 18 new silos started last spring, bringing the total under

Now, officials say that work has also stopped at another six sites, bringing the total down to 288 missiles, 276 of them now judged as ready to fire.

The SS-9, which can carry three five-megaton nuclear warheads, has been painted by the Pentagon in recent years as the biggest threat to survival of the U.S. Minuteman ICBMs.

Defense officials have said frequently that with a force of 420 of these mammoth missiles, each equipped with three warheads, the Russians could wipe out 95% of the 1,000-missile minuteman force in a surprise attack.

### Principal Argument

The SS-9 has also provided the principal argument for building the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile network to protect Minuteman. And, it is the single most important Russian weapon that American negotiators at the now recessed arms talks have been trying to put a specific numbers limitation on.

The latest intelligence information is likely to increase a debate already going on within the Nixon Administration on how and if to respond to the Soviet SS-9 moves.

Others believe the Russians, who have never mentioned the SS-9 cutbacks in discussions at SALT, may be signaling to this country that it is indeed interested in moving toward some agreement.

Pentagon confirmation of the earlier SS-9 slowdown has already brought increased congressional pressure on the President to make a similar gesture

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# Work on Six SS-9 Silos Is Halted by Russians

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union has halted construction on six more underground silos for its huge SS-9 ICBM, well informed U.S. officials report.

The stop in construction work was spotted recently by Air Force photo reconnaissance satellites orbiting over the Russian landmass and is now being reflected in the latest U.S. intelligence estimates, these sources say.

Work was still underway at these sites as recently as three months ago.

The new information comes at a time when the Nixon administration is debating the stance it will take when the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) with the Russians resumes in Vienna on March 15.

This most recent intelligence estimate is the second one within the past two months which reflects apparent continuing cutbacks by the Russians in the SS-9 buildup which got under way in 1964 and continued, with occasional pauses, through mid-1970.

As recently as last Oct. 9, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird publicly credited the Kremlin with "more than 300 SS-9s" including those already deployed plus others for which underground silos were still being prepared.

## Slowdown Confirmed

In December, however, the Pentagon confirmed press reports that a slowdown had been spotted in Russian SS-9 activity.

Informed government sources at that time said privately that work had stopped at 12 of 18 new silos started last spring, bringing the total under 300 to 294. No new sites have been started since then.

Now, officials say that work has also stopped at another six sites, bringing the total down to 288 missiles, 276 of them now judged as ready to fire.

The SS-9, which can carry three five-megaton nuclear warheads, has been painted by the Pentagon in recent years as the biggest threat to survival of the U.S. Minuteman ICBMs.

Defense officials have said frequently that with a force of 420 of these mammoth missiles, each equipped with three warheads, the Russians could wipe out 95 per cent of the 1,000-missile Minuteman force in a surprise attack.

## Main Argument

The SS-9 has also provided the principal argument for building the Safeguard ABM network to protect Minuteman. And, it is the single most important Russian weapon that American negotiators at the now recessed arms talks have been trying to put a specific numbers limitation on.

The latest intelligence information is likely to increase a debate already going on within the Nixon administration on how and if to respond to the Soviet SS-9 moves.

Officials remain cautious of Soviet motives. Some suggest that the SS-9 developments may merely be a pause while the Russians install triple warheads on the missiles.

Others believe the Russians, who have never mentioned the SS-9 cutbacks in discussions at SALT, may be signaling to this country that it is indeed interested in moving toward some agreement.

There is a widespread feeling, however, that by not mentioning the reductions at SALT and letting the U.S. discover it on its own, the Soviets may be attempting to bring

pressure on the White House to accept a tacit limitation on nuclear arms, without an official agreement, something the administration opposes and feels would be dangerous.

## Pressure Increased

Pentagon confirmation of the earlier SS-9 slowdown has already brought increased congressional pressure on the President to make a similar gesture by slowing down or halting work on Safeguard.

The administration is considering such a slowdown, though the President's final position on Safeguard for the coming year is still said to be undecided. Fewer SS-9s, Defense officials admit, reduces somewhat the urgency of the ABM system.

Nevertheless, informed officials report that the administration remains convinced that Safeguard is the best bargaining chip the U.S. has at SALT and wants to keep the program moving, but perhaps at a slower pace.

Officials from several government agencies say there is little doubt that the Russians are more interested in getting the U.S. to halt Safeguard than any other weapon.

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